🌟 I’m thrilled to share that I’ve earned the CISM (Certified Information Security Manager) from ISACA. You can view my achievement on Credly.
🌍 This journey has been both challenging and rewarding, filled with extensive study and deep dives into security governance, incident management, risk management and information security programs.
🚀 I’m proud to have achieved this important milestone in my career. I look forward to leveraging these skills and expertise to drive impactful security initiatives and contribute to the community.
💡 Achieving the Certified Information Security Manager (CISM) certification is about much more than adding a line to your resume. It transforms how you approach, communicate, and prioritize security solutions with a business-centric mindset. After completing CISSP from ISC2, it’s clear that CISM has been one of the most impactful certifications, giving me a structured approach with business priorities always top of mind.
🏢 The exam itself wasn’t necessarily tougher than CISSP. The approach is different, though. But the CISM exam can be very tricky as not all questions have a strictly correct answer. Most of the questions are subjective. Often, it’s a case of choosing the most correct answer or the least wrong answer. Thinking like a manager or understanding the business context/requirements will help you choose the correct answer.
“Success is not the destination; it’s the incredible journey of pushing your limits, embracing challenges, and celebrating every small achievement all the way.”
💼 No certification can replace actual work experience and knowledge obtained from getting your hands dirty. At the same time, certification prep can help in expanding your knowledge.
👉 What do I notice every time I take a certification :
– The quality of my work has improved
– I am more engaged with my work
– I am faster at performing my job
– I have decreased errors in my work
The CISM Mindset:
Think like an Information Security Manager
Human life is always the most important
Everything we do supports the mission of the business
Metrics allow control objectives to be met
IS Governance = Board of directors
IS Program = Board of directors or equivalent gov body
Dialogue is a KEY
Involve stakeholder in collaborative dialogue, understand their needs, face-to-face
Security addendum = terms and conditions – NOT additions
It’s generally accepted that CISO reports to COO (not to CEO)
A problem statement describes the problem in business terms
A problem statement has 2 parts
the description of possible events
the optic that the organization is negligent
Always to align with the business
Always choose a collaborative approach
About CISM materials:
I especially thank Thor Pedersen. All materials he provides on Udemy are truly amazing :
Attacks on OT (Operational Technology) systems are made easier due to the OT/IT convergence.
The figure below is showing an example of OT/IT convergence.
Attacks on OT and ICS systems are modeled by the ICS Cyber Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix described below.
ICS Cyber Kill Chain
Published by SANS in 2015 by Michael Assante and Robert M. Lee as an adaptation of the traditional cyber kill chain developed by Lockheed Martin analysts as it applied to ICSs.
The ICS Cyber Kill Chain details the steps an adversary must follow to perform a high‐confidence attack on the ICS process and/or cause physical damage to equipment in a predictable and controllable way.
ICS Cyber Kill Chain has Two stages:
Stage 1 : Cyber Intrusion Preparation and Execution – « IT »
Stage 2 : ICS Attack Developpement and Execution – « OT »
ICS Cyber Kill Chain mapped to the ICS Zoned Architecture
ICS Zoned Architecture (left) : This is the Purdue Model for ICS Security
Cyber Kill Chain for Industrial Control Systems (right) : This is an ICS Attack as Cascading Events
The ICS Cyber Kill Chain is a powerful approach for Neutralizing a Cyber Attack reducing ICS cyber risk. Security Engineering has the challenge to Kill the Kill Chain
ICS Cyber Kill Chain applied to STUXNET
The figure below is the ICS Cyber Kill Chain applied to STUXNET
About the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix
To go futhermore convergence of IT and OT, and the concept of ICS (Industrial Control System), you can also have a look on the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix.
The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix is an overview of the tactics and techniques described in the ATT&CK for ICS knowledge base. It visually aligns individual techniques under the tactics in which they can be applied.
The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Source: https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Main_Page)
Mapping of Stuxnet attack on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix
Below is the mapping of Stuxnet attack on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Than’ks to Airbus Cybersecurity). « Mapping Stuxnet to the ATT&CK for ICS matrix, as shown in figure 3, quickly shows how complex this attack was. Business risk owners can now identify which techniques to focus on if they need to minimise the risk from strikes like Stuxnet. »
Mapping of Stuxnet on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Source: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/mitre-attck-for-ics-everything-you-need-to-know/)
EMB3D is aligned with and expands on several existing models, including Common Weakness Enumeration, MITRE ATT&CK®, and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, but with a specific embedded-device focus. The threats defined within EMB3D are based on observation of use by threat actors, proof-of-concept and theoretical/conceptual security research publications, and device vulnerability and weakness reports. These threats are mapped to device properties to help users develop and tailor accurate threat models for specific embedded devices.
The videos from the Def Con 32 conference held in Las Vegas from August 8th to 11th are now online. Perfect for keeping busy during the long winter evenings ahead.
I have made a small selection of hashtag#cybersecurity topics on Space and Satellites.
Enjoy watching!
Small Satellite Modeling and Defender Software – Kyle Murbach
Abstract : This talk is meant to inform the next generation in aerospace cybersecurity by discussing our major research milestones, relevant findings, lessons learned, and areas of concern relating to the overall cybersecurity posture of small satellite systems.
Breaking the Beam:Exploiting VSAT Modems from Earth – Lenders, Willbold, Bisping
Abstract : Our presentation at DEF CON is part of a project that has three parts.
In the first part, we focus on the inherent security issues in current VSAT system practices. This work will be appear in May at ACM WiSec 2024.
The second part deals with the systematic evaluation of wireless signal injection attacks using a software-defined radio. This work will appear in August at Usenix Security 2024.
The third part of the project deals with reverse-engineering of the software and network stack of satellite modems and the development of exploits that can be injected over the air through the antenna dish of a VSAT terminal from the ground. This part shall be presented at DEF CON this year.
Analyzing the Security of Satellite Based Air Traffic Control -Martin Strohmeier
Abstract : Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract (ADS-C) is a satellite-based aviation datalink application used to monitor aircraft in remote regions. It is a crucial method for air traffic control to track aircraft where other protocols such as ADS-B lack connectivity. Even though it has been conceived more than 30 years ago, and other legacy communication protocols in aviation have shown to be vulnerable, ADS-C’s security has not been investigated so far in the literature. We conduct a first investigation to close this gap.
Bridging Space and Medicine – Fernando De La Peña Llaca
Abstract : In the vast expanse of space, holographic teleportation—a futuristic blend of holography and teleportation—has revolutionized astronaut communication. Imagine beaming a lifelike 3D image of yourself across light-years. Now, consider its potential in medicine: remote surgeries, expert consultations, and training—where distance dissolves, and expertise transcends borders. Buckle up; holoconnect is our cosmic ticket to healing!
Ground Control to Major Threat Hacking the Space Link Extension Protocol – Andrzej Olch
Abstract : Space missions have increasingly been the subject in the context of security breaches and satellite hacks. The majority of discussions revolve around direct communication and access to spacecraft through means such as Software Defined Radio. However, the reality is that this approach isn’t practical for most adversaries, as it requires substantial resources and is easily detectable due to the power and radio frequencies required to command a spacecraft. Instead, adversaries might shift their focus away from the Space Segment and opt for a more practical approach, such as accessing and exploiting the Ground Segment vulnerabilities and flaws in order to gain control over spacecraft.
From Theory to Reality Demonstrating the Simplicity of SPARTA Techniques – Randi Tinney
Abstract : Demonstrating the transition from theorized space cyber attacks to practical proof of concepts. The presentation will utilize a simple yet effective attack, a man-in-the-middle attack, on the ground infrastructure to demonstrate how many SPARTA techniques and sub-techniques can be performed against a spacecraft from the ground infrastructure. By illustrating the significant impact of this simplified concept, we aim to emphasize the urgent need for enhanced cybersecurity measures throughout the entire lifecycle of space missions and break the inherit trust between the ground and spacecraft.
GPS spoofing it’s about time, not just position – Ken Munro
Abstract : Talking to pilots and operators, an important aspect of GPS spoofing and jamming is being missed from the narrative in the media. We know about position spoofing, that’s a given. What doesn’t appear to be getting much attention is the effect of time spoofing.
Below are not space but aviation security talks
How I Developed a Low Cost Raspberry Pi Based Device for ADS B Spoof – Angelina Tsuboi
The device receives ADS-B information from the antenna and the software-defined radio, which is then passed into a Convolutional Neural Network written with Python to detect whether or not the aircraft is spoofed. I trained the neural network on a dataset of valid ADS-B signals as well as a generated spoofed set of aircraft signals, to teach Fly Catcher how to detect and flag any suspicious ADS-B signals. It does this by checking for discrepancies in the signal’s characteristics, such as its location, velocity, and identification.
The Interplay between Safety and Security in Aviation Systems – Lillian Ash Baker
Abstract : Safety has been at the forefront of Civil Aviation since the formalization of DO-178, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, in 1981. However, times have changed since then and we live in a world with seemingly limitless connectivity. DO-356A, Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations, forms the cybersecurity bedrock in which aviation systems are designed and implemented. In this talk, participants will learn about how Safety and Security is applied to system design and how they interact with one another. Design Assurance Levels (DAL) and Security Assurance Levels (SAL) concepts are presented and explained what their purpose is. This talk is designed to appeal to the general cybersecurity community by introducing fundamentals of Safety analyses and discussing how Safety and Security interact with one another.
RF Attacks on Aviation’s Defense Against Mid-Air Collisions – G. Longo, V. Lenders
Abstract : Aviation’s Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II has been touted as a foolproof safety net since its introduction in the 1980s. But what if we told you that this supposedly impenetrable system can be compromised? For years, attacks on TCAS have been mere theoretical exercises, foiled by an (accidental) built in security feature. That is, until now. In this presentation, we’ll reveal the first working RF attacks on TCAS II, demonstrating how to hijack collision avoidance displays and create fake Traffic Advisories (TAs) and Resolution Advisories (RAs). We’ll walk you through the technical challenges of building the necessary tooling using commercial off-the-shelf hardware.
Navigating the Turbulent Skies of Aviation Cyber Regulation – M. Weigand, S. Wagner
Abstract : This combination presentation and panel discussion will surface the policy and technical challenges associated with securing civil aviation, bringing together perspectives from government, industry, and aviation cybersecurity companies. Given the continued growth in civil aviation and impending regulation in the United States of America and Europe, this talk will describe the key technical challenges and the resulting policy challenges that should be addressed to keep civil aviation secure.
I was quoted in the following article alongside Gerome Billois (Partner – Cybersecurity and Digital Trust – Wavestone) and Martial Gervaise (Cybersecurity Expert – Former Deputy Director at Orange Group). This article shows how important it’s to have a guideline in your cybersecurity career. This article shows also how it’s important to share whith others. It’s not by staying on your own that you grow the community. It’s by sharing that we collectively increase our skills. Cybersecurity grows when it’s shared.
I was elected as a CyberStar (or SpaceCyberStar) by Yohann BAUZIL. CyberStar is a program that highlights those who work to make cybersecurity a reality on a daily basis, either by sharing their knowledge or by their work.
I’m very proud to receive the following certificate of completion for having successfully completed the training course : « Introduction to Cybersecurity in Space Systems » with Tim Fowler.
This training course took place at « The Most Offensive Con that Ever Offensived – Bypass Edition » event organized by Antisyphon Training from 13 to 15 March, 2024.
« Introduction to Cybersecurity in Space Systems » was a course designed to expose cybersecurity professionals to the concepts and implementations of space systems including the ramification and impacts security can have on a mission.
In this course each element was broken down into its most basic components and we had the opportunity to look at how proper security can be applied; what tradeoffs must be made and many of the operational constraints governing every design decision.
This course walked students through each of the segments that make up a space system, the subsystems that comprise a spacecraft, and ways that each need to be defended from attacks.
This course also included multiple hands-on labs that will walk students through the process of implementing a custom ground station solution, a virtual satellite with simulated subsystems, and executing simulated attacks against both.
At the completion of this course, I have now a fundamental knowledge and understanding of space systems, how and where security can be implemented and I have a set of tools, I can use to further their knowledge and experience.
First of all, I want to congratulate Antisyphon Training and Tim Fowler for the high-quality of this training.
My first impressions is that the slides have a high-quality. I noticed that Tim’s terminology is very precise. This shows Tim’s great experience and expertise. The labs was very practical and simulate reality. The lab environment was very comprehensive and highly technical.
In conclusion, I’m really happy and proud to have had this unique opportunity to follow Tim’s training.
It gave me access to unique content of great value. Tim had the opportunity to demonstrate his great expertise and experience on the subject.
I definitely recommend to follow this course to someone who want to increase its knowledge in space systems cybersecurity.
In this article, I will show how I used the MITRE EMB3D™ Threat Model to identify vulnerabilities in SIEMENS PLCs that were exploited by the Stuxnet worm to sabotage the Iran’s nuclear centrifuges.
About the MITRE EMB3D™ Threat Model
EMB3D™ is a Cybersecurity Threat Model release by MITRE in May 2024 and dedicated for Embedded Devices.
EMB3D is aligned with and expands on several existing models, including Common Weakness Enumeration, MITRE ATT&CK®, and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, but with a specific embedded-device focus. The threats defined within EMB3D are based on observation of use by threat actors, proof-of-concept and theoretical/conceptual security research publications, and device vulnerability and weakness reports. These threats are mapped to device properties to help users develop and tailor accurate threat models for specific embedded devices.
Coming in the next release of EMB3D in Summer 2024, each threat description will include a set of Foundational, Intermediate, and Leading mitigations. These mitigations will provide guidance on what technical mechanisms can best prevent or reduce the risk of that threat.
For each threat, EMB3D will suggest technical mechanisms that vendors should build into the device to mitigate the given threat. EMB3D is a comprehensive framework for the entire security ecosystem—device vendors, asset owners, security researchers, and testing organizations.
To know more about the MITRE EMB3D™ Cybersecurity Threat Model for Embedded Devices, check our article here.
About the Stuxnet attack
Stuxnet is a highly sophisticated worm discovered in 2010, believed to be developed jointly by the United States and Israel. It targeted supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, particularly those used in Iran’s nuclear program. Stuxnet specifically aimed at disrupting uranium enrichment processes by sabotaging centrifuges, demonstrating the potential of cyber weapons to physically damage critical infrastructure. Its complex code and ability to spread rapidly made it one of the most advanced and impactful cyber weapons ever deployed.
Stuxnet attack overview
Stuxnet specifically targeted industrial process control systems manufactured by Siemens, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). It exploited vulnerabilities in the software and communication protocols used by these systems to infiltrate and take control of the PLCs. Once infected, the PLCs could be manipulated to disrupt the operation of the centrifuges used in the Iranian nuclear program.
What is STEP 7 in Siemens PLC and how does Siemens PLC work
STEP 7 is a software platform developed by Siemens for programming and configuring its programmable logic controllers (PLCs). It is part of the Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) Portal, which provides a comprehensive suite of tools for automation tasks, including PLC programming, human-machine interface (HMI) design, and more.
Siemens PLCs are industrial control devices used to automate processes in various industries, such as manufacturing, energy, and transportation. They consist of hardware components, such as the CPU (central processing unit), input/output modules, and communication modules, which interface with sensors, actuators, and other devices in the physical environment.
The PLC’s operation is based on a programmed logic controller, which executes a control program created using software like STEP 7. The program defines the behavior of the PLC in response to inputs from sensors and other sources. When inputs change, the PLC processes this information according to the program’s logic and produces outputs to control actuators, machinery, or other devices.
More about the Siemens STEP 7 software platform here.
Identifying properties of the Siemens embedded device
What I consider as an embedded device is the STEP7 Workstation and the Siemens S7 series PLCs.
Device Property #1
Siemens S7-300 PLC does not include a traditional operating system (OS) or kernel in the same sense as a general-purpose computer. Instead, it operates using firmware that is specifically designed for real-time control tasks. This firmware is tightly integrated with the hardware of the PLC and is optimized for deterministic and reliable operation in industrial environments.
Applications and softwares are present and running on Siemens PLCs. These softwares are used for programming and configuring the PLC to perform specific control tasks. In the case of Siemens PLCs, the programming software is typically part of the Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) Portal suite, which includes tools like STEP 7 for programming.
Programmers use this application-level software to create control logic using programming languages such as ladder logic, function block diagram (FBD), or structured text. Once the control program is developed, it is downloaded to the PLC, where it runs directly on the PLC’s firmware.
This application-level software allows users to define the behavior of the PLC, specify how inputs should be processed, define control logic, and configure outputs to interact with the physical environment. It also provides tools for debugging, monitoring, and maintaining the PLC program during operation.
Siemens PLCs, including the S7-300 series, have the ability to deploy custom programs created using engineering software or integrated development environments (IDEs). Siemens provides programming software such as STEP 7 (part of the TIA Portal suite) for developing custom control logic programs.
Siemens PLCs do include system function blocks, which are pre-defined blocks of logic that perform specific tasks within the PLC’s firmware. These function blocks are provided by Siemens as part of the PLC’s programming environment and are used for various system-level tasks, such as reading system information, manipulating data blocks, managing communication protocols, and performing other administrative functions.
The following table is mapping the Device Properties to a list of Threats the Siemens S7 series PLCs may be exposed to because it incorporates those properties and features.
Modeling an attack on an Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
To model an attack on an Industrial Control Systems (ICS), it’s recommanded to use an offensive model.
There are two offensive models dedicated to Industrial Control Systems (ICS):
The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix
The ICS Cyber Kill Chain
To know more how to model an attack on an Industrial Control Systems (ICS) but also about the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix and the ICS Cyber Kill Chain, go to out entire and complete article on this subject here.
Mapping of Stuxnet attack on the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix
Below is the mapping of Stuxnet attack on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Than’ks to Airbus Cybersecurity). « Mapping Stuxnet to the ATT&CK for ICS matrix, as shown in figure 3, quickly shows how complex this attack was. Business risk owners can now identify which techniques to focus on if they need to minimise the risk from strikes like Stuxnet. »
Mapping of Stuxnet on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Source: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/mitre-attck-for-ics-everything-you-need-to-know/)
ICS Cyber Kill Chain applied to STUXNET
The figure below is the ICS Cyber Kill Chain applied to STUXNET.
Collaborative framework provides common understanding to mitigate cyber threats to critical infrastructure
MCLEAN, Va. & BEDFORD, Mass., May 13, 2024–(BUSINESS WIRE)–The EMB3D Threat Model is now publicly available at https://emb3d.mitre.org. The model provides a cultivated knowledge base of cyber threats to embedded devices, providing a common understanding of these threats with the security mechanisms required to mitigate them. The model is the result of a collaborative effort by MITRE, Niyo Little Thunder Pearson, Red Balloon Security, and Narf Industries.
“The diverse perspectives and invaluable insights shared have fortified our approach, ensuring a robust and effective solution to address the evolving challenges in embedded device security.”
EMB3D model strengthened by peer reviews from infrastructure industries
After the model garnered significant interest for peer review across diverse industries, numerous organizations piloted the threat model, offering invaluable feedback. The EMB3D team appreciates the interest and feedback from vendors and integrators across many industries, including energy, water, manufacturing, aerospace, health, and automotive, as well as researchers and threat tool vendors. This ongoing collaborative effort has been instrumental in refining and enhancing the model’s content and usability. The team looks forward to continued collaboration to strengthen the ability of the model to enable “secure by design.”
“Our framework’s strength lies in the collaborative efforts and rigorous review process across industries,” said Yosry Barsoum, vice president and director, Center for Securing the Homeland at MITRE. “The diverse perspectives and invaluable insights shared have fortified our approach, ensuring a robust and effective solution to address the evolving challenges in embedded device security.”
Leveraging established models to strengthen embedded device security
EMB3D aligns with and expands on several existing models, including Common Weakness Enumeration, MITRE ATT&CK®, and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, but with a specific embedded-device focus. The threats defined within EMB3D are based on observation of use by threat actors, proof-of-concept and theoretical/conceptual security research publications, and device vulnerability and weakness reports. These threats are mapped to device properties to help users develop and tailor accurate threat models for specific embedded devices.
For each threat, EMB3D suggests technical mechanisms that vendors should build into the device to mitigate the given threat. EMB3D is a comprehensive framework for the entire security ecosystem—device vendors, asset owners, security researchers, and testing organizations.
Associated mitigations
Each threat includes mitigation guidance, these often have varying efficacies and challenges with their implementations.
Mitigation tiers are intended to help device vendors/OEMs better understand how to assess the challenge of deploying mitigations and better strategize and prioritize efforts to add additional mitigations or technologies to address threats.
ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 Mappings
ISA is the International Society of Automation. ISA/IEC 62443 is the applicable standard for cybersecurity of OT and ICS (IACS).
Each associated mitigation is mapped with the ISA/IEC 62443-4-2.
An evolving framework for a dynamic threat landscape
EMB3D is intended to be a living framework, where new threats and mitigations are added and updated as new threat actors emerge and security researchers discover new categories of vulnerabilities, threats, and security defenses. EMB3D is a public, community resource where all information is openly available and the security community can submit additions and revisions.
MITRE’s mission-driven teams are dedicated to solving problems for a safer world. Through our public-private partnerships and federally funded R&D centers, we work across government and in partnership with industry to tackle challenges to the safety, stability, and well-being of our nation. Learn more at mitre.org.
In March of 2022, Network battalion 65 (NB65), a hacktivist affiliate of Anonymous, publicly asserted its successful breach of ROSCOSMOS’s satellite imaging capabilities in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
NB65 disseminated a series of primary sources as substantiation, proclaiming the incapacitation of ROSCOSMOS’s space-based vehicle monitoring system and doxing of related proprietary documentation.
Despite the profound implications of hacktivist incursions into the space sector, the event has garnered limited attention due to the obscurity of technical attack vectors and ROCOSMOS’s denial of NB65’s allegations.
Through analysis of NB65’s released primary sources of evidence, this paper uncovers the probable vulnerabilities and exploits that enabled the alleged breach into ROSCOSMOS’s ground and space segment. Additionally, this paper highlights lessons learned and the consequences this event has for the global aerospace community.
The authors of this paper are : Rajiv Thummala and Gregory Falco
I february 2024, I successfully passed the Certificate of Competence in Zero Trust (CCZT) from the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA).
This certificate is a logical follow-up to the CCSK (Certificate of Cloud Security Knowledge) awarded by the same CSA organization (to know more about CCSK, read my article here).
Zero Trust Philosophy is :
Never Trust Always verify
Assume a hostile environment
Assume breach
Scrutinize explicitly
Apply unified analytics
The CCZT is considered the first Zero Trust certificate in the industry, developed by combining the guidance of Zero Trust experts, foundational documents from authoritative sources, and leadership from vendor-neutral CSA Research.
Building on the foundational principle of Zero Trust that no part of a computing and networking system can be implicitly trusted, CCZT will give you the knowledge and skills necessary to implement a Zero Trust strategy and reduce systemic risk.
CCZT outlines how to put specific measures in place to provide assurance that systems and their components operate appropriately and are continuously verified.
CCZT enables you to understand and implement Zero Trust principles into business planning, enterprise architectures, and technology deployments.
The Certificate of Competence in Zero Trust consists of the following topics:
PenTest and Hakin9 are very proud to present with a special edition, created in a collaborative process between experts in the field of space cybersecurity, PenTest, and Hakin9 magazines. The topic is currently getting more and more deserved attention, and they are more than happy to bring experts’ voice to the table here.
In the “Space Cybersecurity” eBook by PenTest & Hakin9 you will read about this fascinatingarea from a variety of perspectives: from the future of optical and laser communication and its security, through cybersecurity measures in modern space exploration, simulating the test of space systems with S-WAN, end-to-end security management system using COSMOS2, Space threats and operational risks to mission, security by design for satellites, to the relevant information about ASAT, geopolitical aspects of space cybersecurity, and cybersecurity in the ground segment for space industry.
It is a great compendium of knowledge provided by the practitioners in the field. Special thanks to all the contributors, reviewers, and proofreaders involved in the creation of this issue.
Let’s launch and dive in the reading process.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Future of Satellite Communication: Optical Communication and Lasers. Is it Secure? from Angelina Tsuboi
Although there are a plethora of benefits that emerge from migrating to optical- based communications infrastructure, it still has some drawbacks. Firstly, optical communications rely on high precision since information is sent via a narrow beam pointed at the receiver. This significantly reduces the margin for error as even a slight deviation of the beam could result in signal disruption. Moreover, optical signals are highly vulnerable to interference found in external light emissions from various sources like the sun and other optical signals. Both of these factors make optical communications vulnerable to interception, spoofing, jamming, and physical attacks.
Cybersecurity Measures in Modern Space Exploration from Sylvester Kaczmarek
As with any computerized system, autonomous space systems are vulnerable to software-based attacks. Malicious entities could potentially introduce rogue software into these systems. Such software could subtly alter the system’s behavior, making it perform unintended actions or even sabotage its mission. For instance, a malicious software injection could alter a satellite’s data collection parameters, leading it to transmit false or corrupted data back to Earth. In the case of an autonomous rover on a distant planet, such an attack could result in it straying into hazardous terrain or failing to carry out its scientific objectives. Moreover, the specific security risks vary between different types of autonomous space systems. For instance, autonomous satellites managing Earth observation may be targeted to manipulate environmental data, while rovers exploring extraterrestrial surfaces could be commandeered to disrupt scientific discovery or misrepresent findings.
S-WAN: Simulate the Test of Space systems from Jamel Metmati
The simulation doesn’t replace the test on the real chambers once the satellite’s assembled. It provides support on the process between the preliminary design and the assembly, integration and test phase, the operational activity in space. The simulation gives an environment test to monitor and control the satellites to understand anomalies to be studied and to be corrected on short notice.
Space Threats and Operational Risks to Mission (STORM) from William Ferguson
There is a clear need for space cybersecurity workforce development that will require public, private, and international government cooperation. Significant progress is already being made with the ongoing efforts to build space cybersecurity skills through cutting-edge platforms like Moonlighter, an on-orbit cybersecurity training platform, Hack-a-Sat, and established communities like the Aerospace Village that have existed for some time. But there is still more work to be done.
End-to-End Security Management of Space Systems using COSMOS2 from Dr Jordan Plotnek
This article provides an overview of the outcomes of a multi-year research project resulting in the novel COSMOS2 (Contemporary Ontology for the Security Management of Space Systems) framework, developed through iterative feedback from space security experts across 10 countries. The framework includes a definition for space systems security and a tabular taxonomy encompassing the protection of five segments (Ground, Space, Communications, Human, and Governance) against four threat categories (Non-Malicious, Cyber, Electromagnetic, and Kinetic).
Safeguarding Earth’s Frontline: The Crucial Role of Cybersecurity in Space Operations from Olga Nasibullina
To fortify cybersecurity in space operations, there is a need for increased education. Initiatives like the European Space Agency’s collaboration with Rhea Group have led to the development of dedicated Space Operations Cyber Ranges. These ranges offer services such as preparation, testing, and training for cyberattacks, along with 24/7 managed Security Operations Centre (SOC) support. Two consortia consisting of Estonian companies are developing a concept for a space cyber training range. The first consortium includes Spaceit, CybExer, and CGI; the second includes Nortal and Talgen. Foundation CR14, established by the Estonian defense ministry, is also a member of both consortia. The new range should, among other things, allow us to simulate specific space-related environments and potential threats, validate various industry-specific components and processes, and contribute to the development of know-how related to space cyber defense.
Space Cybersecurity: a Strategic Issue in the Current Geopolitical Context from Anais Shay-Lynn Videlingum
The security of space infrastructures is a geopolitical issue, as space-based resources are increasingly used by our societies in all fields, from construction and financial markets to military capabilities. The rapid development of objects and services powered by satellites is contributing to a growing dependence on space in all fields. Being present in space has become a strategic issue over time, depending on the interest of decision-makers in the use of space. Protecting satellites in low, medium, or geostationary orbit is now a strategic asset for governments, the military, and commercial operators alike, to ensure continuity of service and guarantee a degree of resilience.
Space Oddities: What is ‘Secure-by-Design’ and Why Does it Matter for Satellites? from Mikols Tomka and Isabela Leandersson, Pasimoni and Tarides
In response to the cybersecurity agencies’ advice, some people may argue that the risks are mitigated in the context of Space IoT and edge computing because satellites are more difficult to attack. Unfortunately, this could not be further from the truth. Not only are satellites vulnerable to attack, but the infrastructure they provide is critical to many fundamental systems across the globe. Much of that critical infrastructure is, as of today, relatively unprotected!
🌟 I'm thrilled to share that I've earned the CISM (Certified Information Security Manager) from ISACA. You can view my achievement on Credly.
🌍 This...
Attacks on OT (Operational Technology) systems are made easier due to the OT/IT convergence.
The figure below is showing an example of OT/IT convergence.
Attacks on OT...
What an incredible start to 2024.
I've had some incredible opportunities and I've been able to do some really interesting things.
I continue my role as...
I’m very proud to receive the following certificate of completion for having successfully completed the training course : « Introduction to Cybersecurity in Space...
KYPO is a Cyber Range Platform (KYPO CRP) developed by Masaryk University since 2013. KYPO CRP is entirely based on state-of-the-art approaches such as...
Avec l'aimable autorisation de Martial Le Guédard, nous reproduisons ci-dessous sa cartographie au sujet des différents acteurs étatiques évoluant dans le domaine du Cyber...
